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“Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]”

1

EXAMINING THE FCC’S OVERBROAD CALLING
REGULATIONS UNDER THE TCPA
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Pew Research Center conducted a study that
revealed that more than 90% of American adults own and operate
cellular telephones (“cell phones”).2 The study indicated that
Americans use cell phones because they feel comfortable knowing
they have the ability to instantly connect with friends and family,
emergency services, and the internet.3 This convenience, however,
has come at a cost. Over the past several years, cell phone users
have increasingly endured unsolicited telemarketing calls and
texts to their devices.4
Americans make it abundantly clear that they detest
telemarketing calls.5 In 2014, the Federal Communication
Commission6 (FCC or Commission) received more than 5,000
consumer complaints each month from consumers regarding
telemarketing calls made to their cell phones.7 Similarly, in 2013
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported a large increase
in consumer complaints related to telemarketing.8 While
telemarketers have found cell phones useful to do their bidding,
Adele, Hello, on 25 (XL Recordings 2015).
Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(June 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownershiphits-91-of-adults/ [https://perma.cc/PN9P-HUYS].
3 Id.
4 Statement of Chairman Tom Wheeler, In re Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 8066 (2015)
[hereinafter Wheeler Statement].
5 See id. (“The American public has asked us—repeatedly—to do something
about unwanted robocalls.”).
6 The FCC is responsible for “prescrib[ing] regulations to implement the
requirements of [the TCPA].” Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(2) (2012).
7 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7969 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Order].
8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY DATA BOOK 8 (2015)
[hereinafter NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY]; see also Spencer Weber Waller et al., The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing
Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 389 (2014).
1
2
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consumers have withstood, and despised, telemarketing calls
since long before cell phones were a staple of American life. In
1991, Congress noted that over “300,000 solicitors call[ed] more
than 18,000,000 Americans every day.”9 The hit 1990s sitcom
Seinfeld documented American consumers’ frustration with
this abundance of telemarketing calls.10 In an episode called
“The Pitch,” Jerry, the show’s title character, answers a phone
call from a telemarketer and asks for the telemarketer’s home
phone number.11 When the caller refuses, Jerry replies, “Oh I
guess you don’t want people calling you at home . . . . Well, now
you know how I feel!”12
In an effort to protect consumers’ privacy rights and
safety, Congress amended Title II of the Communications Act
of 1934 to enact the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA).13 The TCPA imposes restrictions on calls14 made using
automatic telephone dialing systems (autodialers) or prerecorded
voice messages.15 The statute defines an autodialer as equipment
that is capable of “(A) stor[ing] or produc[ing] telephone
numbers . . . using a random or sequential number generator; and
(B) to dial such numbers.”16 The statute prohibits the use of
autodialers or prerecorded voice messages to call emergency lines,
cellular telephones, or hospitals without express permission from
the called party if those calls are not made for emergency
purposes.17 Similarly, callers cannot use prerecorded voice
9 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105
Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
10 Seinfeld: The Pitch (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 1992), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=hllDWSbuDsQ [https://perma.cc/L4QQ-P8C4].
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Act of
1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8753 ¶ 2 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Order].
14 Interestingly, while the TCPA was enacted in response to unwanted
telemarketing calls, the statute imposes restrictions on “any call[s]” made using autodialer
equipment. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added). The Commission refers to
“telemarketing” calls (and telemarketers) throughout its rules and amending regulations,
and has defined “telemarketing” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the
purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any person.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12)(2015). A
“telemarketer” is a “person or entity that initiates a telephone call or message for the
purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any person.” Id. § 64.1200(f)(11). These definitions stem
from the statute’s use of the phrase “telephone solicitation,” which is “the initiation of a
telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or
investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(4). While telemarketing calls are a bigger nuisance to consumers, it is important to
note that the statute also restricts non-telemarketing calls made using autodialer
technology. See id. § 227(b)(1)(A), (B).
15 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), (B).
16 Id. § 227(a)(1).
17 Id. § 227(b)(1)(A).
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messages to call residential lines without permission from the
homeowner.18 The TCPA also creates two private rights of action
so consumers can enforce the statute against infringing entities.19
In addition to providing consumers a private right of
action, Congress appointed the FCC to prescribe rules and
regulations to enforce the statute and protect consumers from
unwanted calls.20 Pursuant to this power, the Commission
promulgated many TCPA regulations between 1992 and 2016.21
In 2015, however, the Commission published regulations that
excessively expanded the statute’s scope to prohibit calls made
by ordinary people using everyday technology.22 In a declaratory
ruling and order released on July 10, 2015 (2015 Order), the
Commission interpreted “capacity” so broadly that, as a result, it
ruled that autodialers include equipment that has both the
present and “potential” ability to dial random and sequential
numbers.23 This interpretation vastly widens the definition of
“autodialer” and will be problematic for consumers. Many
everyday devices, most notably smartphones, can potentially
store, produce, and dial random sequential numbers.24 Since the
TCPA and its amending regulations25 center around a device’s
capacity to perform autodialer functions rather than how it is
actually used, smartphone users can theoretically violate the
TCPA by simply using their devices.26 As a result, more than
90% of American adults27 now wander around the United
States with autodialers in their pockets. This newly defined,
broader class of autodialers will lead to a surge in TCPA
violations and lawsuits.
Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(5)(A)–(C). Each private right of action enables
consumers to either recover $500 in damages for each call that violates the statute, or
“actual monetary loss from a violation,” whichever is greater. Id. Further, under either
action, a court may award up to three times that amount ($1,500) if it finds the
violations are intentional. Id. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5).
20 See id. § 227(b)(2).
21 See infra Section I.C.
22 See generally Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai, In re Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC
Rcd. 8074 (2015) [hereinafter Pai Statement] (arguing that the FCC’s 2015 declaratory
ruling “dramatically expands the TCPA’s reach” because (1) the Commission’s
interpretation of what constitutes an autodialer is overbroad, and (2) invites plaintiffs’
attorneys to bring lawsuits against “good-faith” telemarketers).
23 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015) (“[T]he capacity of an autodialer is not
limited to its current configuration but also includes its potential functionalities.”
(interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (f)(2) (2015)).
24 See id. at 7976 (“[A] broad interpretation of ‘capacity’ could potentially sweep
in smartphones because they may have the capacity to store telephone numbers to be
called and to dial such numbers through the use of an app or other software.”).
25 See C.F.R. § 64.1200 (f)(2) (2015); 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015).
26 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8076 (2015).
27 See Rainie, supra note 2.
18
19
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The Commission’s interpretation is problematic for several
reasons. First, Congress did not intend for the Commission to
interpret “capacity” so broadly when it drafted the TCPA.28
Second, the interpretation runs contrary to several court decisions
that did not interpret autodialers to include devices with the
“potential” ability to dial and store randomized numbers.29 Third,
the interpretation will shift TCPA enforcement efforts away from
intentional, and possibly malicious, violators30 and lead to an
increase in frivolous TCPA lawsuits that target legitimate
business practices or ordinary people using everyday technology
to communicate.31 In his dissenting statement regarding the 2015
Order, FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai discusses a hypothetical
situation that best illustrates the overall problematic effect of the
Commission’s interpretation:
Jim meets Jane at a party. The next day, he wants to follow up on
their conversation and ask her out for lunch. He gets her cellphone
number from a mutual friend and texts her from his smartphone.
Pursuant to the Order, Jim has violated the TCPA, and Jane could
sue him for $500 in statutory damages.32

Given the newly expanded class of technologies that
constitutes autodialers, companies are more likely to
inadvertently violate the statute, and so are consumers. The new
interpretation will enable plaintiffs’ attorneys to take advantage
of these mistakes, and use the TCPA to target useful or
legitimate communications between consumers, and between

See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., No. C 11–2584 PJH, 2015 WL 475111,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (“[T]he relevant inquiry under the TCPA is whether a
defendant’s equipment has the present capacity to perform autodialing functions . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (W.D.
Wash. 2014) (“The Court declines to expand the definition of an ATDS to cover equipment
that merely has the potential to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or
sequential number generator or to dial telephone numbers from a list without human
intervention.”); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.
Cal. 2014) (declining to expand the definition of autodialers to include devices with
potential capacity to perform the necessary functions because “[i]t seems unlikely that
Congress intended to subject such a wide swath of the population to a law designed to
combat unwanted and excessive telemarketing.”).
30 While the number of companies that pay to access the National Do Not Call
List has declined, consumer complaints have continued to increase. See infra Section III.A.
This trend indicates that fewer companies are making legal telemarketing calls, and many
are making telemarketing calls that intentionally disregard the TCPA. The Commission’s
newest amending regulations do nothing to remedy this issue. See infra Section III.A.
31 Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
32 Id. at 8076. As per the FCC’s 2003 Order, text messages constitute “calls” for
purposes of the TCPA. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14115 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Order].
Accordingly, all references to “calls” in this note also include text messages.
28
29
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businesses and their customers.33 The FCC dismissed concerns
regarding this increased potential for TCPA abuse because
consumers have not typically brought these suits before.34 This
dismissal was misplaced; the new scope of autodialer technology
will lead to an increase in TCPA lawsuits because consumers
and plaintiffs’ attorneys will begin to take advantage of the
broader autodialer definition.35
To remedy this problem, the Commission should narrow
its definition of “capacity” under the TCPA so that the scope of
autodialer technology is less inclusive.36 More specifically, the
FCC should re-interpret “capacity,” so that only devices that are
presently configured37 to store, produce and dial random or
sequential numbers constitute an autodialer. This alternative
interpretation would comport with Congress’ intended definition
of an autodialer while (1) enabling the Commission to enforce the
TCPA against purposeful offenders, and (2) lowering companies’
risk of violating the TCPA when using everyday technology to
communicate with customers.38 It would also help to prevent a
new influx of frivolous TCPA lawsuits that threaten legitimate
businesses or involve actions between private consumers.
Id.
See 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7976–77 (2015). The FCC reasoned that there
was no evidence “that individual consumers have been sued based on typical use of
smartphone technology” or that “friends, relatives, and companies with which consumers
do business find those calls unwanted and take legal action against the calling
consumer.” Id. at 7977.
35 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8076, 8073 (2015).
36 See Monica Desai et al., A TCPA for the 21st Century: Why TCPA Lawsuits
Are on the Rise and What the FCC Should Do About It, 8 INT’L J. OF MOBILE MKTG. 75,
81 (2013).
37 For example, under this interpretation, devices such as smartphones would
have the “capacity” to store, produce and dial random or sequential numbers only if they
have downloaded software or applications that enable them to do so. Furthermore, in
accordance with the TCPA’s emphasis on capacity rather than use, the devices do not
need to be used to perform autodialer functions in order to constitute autodialers—they
only need to contain software or an autodialing program. See 42 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2012).
38 Narrowing the FCC’s overbroad definition of “autodialer” would make it harder
for companies to violate the TCPA because it would decrease the likelihood that the
technology used constitutes an “autodialer.” For example, in Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., the
defendant, a cab company doing business as TaxiMagic, sent text messages to customers
that called for a cab to confirm their ride was on the way. Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., 995 F.
Supp. 2d 1189, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2014). The messages included useful information, such
as the cab’s car number, the cab driver’s name, and the distance from the dispatch
location and the consumer. Id. To send these messages, TaxiMagic uses a computer
program that is controlled manually by the taxi dispatcher. Id. at 1194. The court held that
this computer program did not constitute an autodialer because it did not presently have the
capacity to store or dial random phone numbers without human intervention. Id. However,
under the Commission’s new interpretation, such communication would be a TCPA
violation, despite its helpful nature, because the computer program could be potentially
manipulated into a device with autodialer capability. See infra Section II.A. Maintaining a
narrower interpretation would help protect useful communications like the ones
TaxiMagic employed from frivolous TCPA suits.
33
34
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Furthermore, in order to protect consumers from intentional
TCPA violators, the Commission should require that service
carriers offer consumers a call-blocking option that would allow
them to block categories of phone numbers.39 While this
solution is not perfect, it would lessen the potentially harmful
effects of fraudulent companies engaged in mass-dialing until a
more permanent one becomes available.
Part I of this note provides background on the TCPA,
which includes an overview of important regulations the FCC has
enacted to enforce the law between 1992 and 2015. Part II
describes the FCC’s new definition of autodialer and discusses the
reasons the interpretation is problematic. Part III examines the
likely effect of the FCC’s new autodialer interpretation by
referencing recent TCPA lawsuits and settlement agreements.
Finally, Part IV recommends that the FCC (1) narrow its definition
of capacity so that autodialers no longer include devices with the
potential capacity to store and dial randomized numbers, and (2)
require service providers to offer consumers a call-blocking service
so they can control which types of calls they receive.
I.

REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE TCPA

A.

TCPA Calling Restrictions

Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act on December 20, 1991, “to address a growing number of
telemarketing calls and certain telemarketing practices thought
to be an invasion of consumer privacy and a risk to public
safety.”40 Congress was concerned with the autodialer’s ability to
seize phone lines with prerecorded messages, preventing other
use of those lines, particularly in emergency situations.41
39 Such technology would allow consumers to tell their service providers they
want to block all phone calls from certain categories of callers. See 2015 Order, 30 FCC
Rcd. 8036 (2015). For example, consumers could specify they no longer wanted to
receive phone calls from telemarketers. Id. This technology is still under development,
though some “providers already offer [call] blocking services that go beyond individual
numbers . . . specified by the consumer.” Id. AT&T recently announced that it is creating
a Robocalling “Strike Force” designed to develop new call-blocking technologies and other
means to enable consumers to block unwanted calls. Brian Fung, AT&T Is Leading a
Crackdown on Obnoxious Robo-Calls, WASH. POST (July 26, 2016); see also Bob Quinn,
Answering the Call on Robocalling, AT&T PUB. POLICY BLOG (July 25, 2016), http://www.
attpublicpolicy.com/fcc/answering-the-call-on-robocalling/ [https://perma.cc/G6YZ-4NQ9].
40 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14018 ¶ 4 (2003); see Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(2012)).
41 During
pre-TCPA congressional hearings, members of the Senate
introduced legislation to “ban all autodialer calls to the telephone lines of hospitals, fire
departments, and police stations” because autodialers had frequently tied up these
types of emergency numbers. Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991;
The Telephone Advertising Consumer Protection Act; and Equal Billing For Long
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Furthermore, Congress sought to protect consumers from being
disturbed in sensitive places, particularly the home.42
Accordingly, the TCPA limits calls and unsolicited advertisements
sent by autodialers, artificial or prerecorded voice messages, and
fax machines.43 Absent an emergency or prior express consent
from the called party, the TCPA prohibits callers from using
autodialers or prerecorded messages, also known as “robocalls,”44
when calling any emergency line,45 any guest or patient of a
hospital or health care facility,46 wireless phone numbers,47 or
more than two telephone lines of a multi-business line.48 The
TCPA also prohibits calls made to any residential line using an
artificial or prerecorded voice without receiving consent from the
called party.49 Finally, the statute prohibits the use of fax
machines for sending unsolicited fax advertisements.50 These
restrictions seek to protect consumer privacy while “permit[ting]
legitimate telemarketing practices.”51
B.

Private Right of Action

Congress designed the TCPA “to rely on enforcement by
private parties.”52 Accordingly, the TCPA contains two private
rights of action for consumers. First, § 227(b)(3) permits
consumers to bring an action based on any single violation of

Distance Charges, Hearing on S. 1462, S. 1410 and S. 857 Before the Subcomm. on
Comm’cs of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 102d Cong. 6 (1991) (statement
of Senator Pressler). Congress also heard testimony from citizens who had experienced
autodialers blocking consumer phone lines when they tried to make 9-1-1 calls. Id. at
13 (statement of Robert Bulmash, Private Citizen, Inc.).
42 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 2.
43 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2012).
44 Robocalls are calls in which the speaking voices are automatic, preprogrammed responders.
45 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i); see 47C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(i) (2015).
46 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(ii); see 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(ii).
47 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). This provision does not include calls made to
wireless customers by their wireless carriers, as long as they will not be charged for
the call. Id.
48 Id. § 227(b)(1)(D); see 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(5) (2015). There are three
exceptions to this provision of the statute—emergency calls, non-commercial calls, and calls
made for a commercial purpose that are not telemarketing calls. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B).
These types of calls may be made to residences using an artificial or prerecorded voice. 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B); see 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(i)–(iii).
49 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3). However, if the
sender has an established business relationship with the consumer, or the consumer
has provided express consent to receive the faxes, the sender may send unsolicited
advertisements. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(i)–(ii).
50 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4).
51 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105
Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
52 Waller et al., supra note 8, at 358.
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§ 227(b) of the TCPA.53 Similarly, the TCPA includes a private
right of action54 for consumers who have received more than one
call from a single entity “within any 12-month period” that
violates the FCC regulations enacted to enforce the TCPA.55
Consumers may seek injunctive relief or monetary damages
under both private rights of action and can recover $500 in
damages for each violation.56 Furthermore, a court may award
up to three times that amount ($1,500) per violation if it finds
the defendant intentionally violated the TCPA.57
This provision of the statute has enabled consumers to
recover from telemarketers that burdened them with unwanted
calls. One recent example is King v. Time Warner Cable—a
case decided by the Southern District of New York in 2015.58
Araceli King brought an action against Time Warner Cable in
March 2014, alleging that the company’s interactive voice
response system called her cell phone, without permission, 163
times between July 3, 2013, and August 11, 2014.59 The Court
awarded King the maximum $1,500 penalty per violation
because Time Warner Cable made 153 of the calls after King
revoked her consent to receive them.60 The court also noted that
Time Warner Cable continued to call King after she filed the
TCPA lawsuit, which made those calls “particularly egregious.”61
Since the TCPA imposes strict liability for violations, consumers
like King find the private rights of action to be a successful
means of enforcing the TCPA and subsequent FCC regulations.62
C.

Overview of FCC Amending Regulations Between 1992
and 2015

Congress authorized the FCC to enact “regulations to
implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy
rights” of consumers.63 Specifically, Congress requested the
Commission engage in a rulemaking proceeding to (1) consider
alternative ways to improve the effectiveness and cost of TCPA
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
This right of action refers to regulations that the FCC enacted pursuant to the
enforcement power Congress granted it in §§ 227(b) and (c) of the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b), (c).
55 Id. § 227(c)(5).
56 Id. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(5)(A)–(C).
57 Id.
58 King v. Time Warner Cable, 113 F. Supp. 3d 718 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
59 Id. at 721–22.
60 Id. at 722.
61 Id. at 727.
62 See infra Section III.b.2.ii.
63 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) (2012).
53
54
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regulation, (2) discuss implementing further calling restrictions,
and (3) develop regulations that would most effectively accomplish
the TCPA’s purpose.64 As a result, the FCC has made several
amending regulations to the TCPA.
In 1992, the Commission implemented two major TCPA
regulations. First, the FCC ordered that callers create companyspecific Do Not Call lists.65 This regulation required companies
to maintain a list of residential telephone subscribers who
request not to be called.66 Companies are responsible for
keeping their lists updated, and in the event of a lawsuit, the
burden is on telemarketers to prove that they met the
standards for maintaining their lists.67 Second, the Commission
prohibited telemarketers from calling consumers before 8 a.m.
or after 9 p.m.68
In 2003, the Commission further expanded the scope of
the TCPA. It created the National Do Not Call Registry, which
is a service that allows consumers to formally request that
telemarketers do not call them by registering their phone number
on a national list.69 Entities that wish to use telemarketing to
promote their businesses must pay to access the list70 and keep
track of which consumers are on it.71 In addition to creating the
National Do Not Call Registry, the FCC required that
telemarketers display their identification information on
consumers’ Caller-ID services.72 The Commission also broadened
the statute’s definition of “unsolicited advertisements” to include
calls that advertise free offers to consumers.73 Finally, in an effort
64
65

20 (1992).
66

20 (1992).
67

20 (1992).

Id. § 227(c)(1).
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(1)–(5); 1992 Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8757, 8763 ¶¶ 9,
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(1)–(5); 1992 Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8757, 8763 ¶¶ 9,
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(1)–(5); 1992 Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8757, 8763 ¶¶ 9,

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(1).
Id.; 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14033–34 (2003). Consumers may decide to put
their number on the National Do Not Call List, but can provide express permission to
specific companies to receive telemarketing calls. Id. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) maintains the list. Id at ¶ 27.
70 Companies pay the FTC a fee to access the phone numbers on the Do Not Call
List. Companies can access five area codes for free, and for any additional area codes, must
pay $60 per area code of data, with a maximum annual fee of no more than $16,482. See
Q&A for Telemarketers & Sellers About DNC Provisions in TSR, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/qa-telemarketers-sellers-aboutdnc-provisions-tsr#payingforaccess [https://perma.cc/995B-YDPG] (last updated Oct. 2014).
71 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14033–34 (2003).
72 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(e). This means that telemarketers cannot be listed as
“unknown” callers.
73 Id. § 64.1200(f)(1). The statute defines “unsolicited advertisements” as “any
material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or
services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express
68
69
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to further protect cellphone users’ privacy rights under the
TCPA, the Commission declared that the statute’s definition of
“call” included text messages.74
In 2012, the Commission strengthened consumer
protection from unwanted calls in several respects. One
amendment required consumers to provide callers with prior,
express written75 consent for all autodialed or prerecorded
telemarketing calls made to residential or wireless numbers.76 In
order to constitute “express written consent,” the writing must (1)
include the consumer’s signature, and (2) clearly and
conspicuously authorize the seller to call for telemarketing
purposes using an autodialer or prerecorded voice.77 The signed
writing may be electronic.78 This requirement is different for nontelemarketing informational79 calls to wireless numbers, which
are permitted with either oral or written consent from the
consumer. Further, the FCC established a mandatory “opt out”
requirement for all robocalls.80 Any robocall that can be answered
by the consumer in person must include a mechanism at the

invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5) (2012). The
statute restricts the use of any fax machine, computer or other device to send an
unsolicited advertisement to a fax machine. Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).
74 [U]nder the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any wireless
telephone number . . . . This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to
wireless numbers including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls,
provided the call is made to a telephone number assigned to such service.

2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14115 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
75 The Commission noted that the “TCPA is silent on the issue of what form of
express consent—oral, written, or some other kind—is required for calls that use an
automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded voice to deliver a telemarketing
message.” In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd. 1838 ¶ 21 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Order].
76 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2), (3); 2012 Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 1839 (2012).
77 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8).
78 Id. § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii). The signature may include electronic or digital form of
signature, e.g. typing a name or checking a box, so long as the form comports with federal
or state ESIGN laws. Id.
79 2012 Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 1841 (2012).
Moreover, while we revise our consent rules to require prior written consent
for autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls, we maintain the existing
consent rules for non-telemarketing, informational calls, such as those by or
on behalf of tax-exempt non-profit organizations, calls for political purposes,
and calls for other noncommercial purposes, including those that deliver
purely information messages such as school closings. Our rules for these calls
will continue to permit oral consent if made to wireless consumers and other
specified recipients, and will continue to require no prior consent if made to
residential wireline consumers.
Id.
80

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b)(3); 2012 Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 1848 (2012).
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beginning of the message that allows the consumer to opt-out of
future calls.81
On July 10, 2015, the FCC published an additional,
comprehensive set of regulations.82 Some of these regulations
expand the statute’s scope by considering recent technological
changes. For example, the FCC ruled that smartphone
application providers do not obtain prior express consent to call
consumers merely because their wireless numbers were in
another application user’s contacts.83 Additionally, the
Commission clarified a caller’s liability when a number that
previously belonged to one consumer, who had given express
consent to be called, is reassigned to a new consumer.84 Under
these circumstances, the telemarketer is permitted to make one
call after the reassignment.85 After this call, the FCC declared
that the callers (1) are on notice the consumer’s number has
changed, and (2) must obtain consent to continue making calls to
that number.86 The Commission also emphasized that consumers
are able to revoke their consent to receive robocalls in a
reasonable manner at any time.87
Although the Commission made several important
amendments in the 2015 Order, its most influential change was
broadening the definition of autodialer. In the Order, the FCC
declared that “autodialers” include equipment that has both the
present and potential ability to dial random and sequential
numbers.88 This interpretation broadly expanded the scope of
the TCPA such that it no longer comports with Congress’s intent
to avoid burdening businesses with excessive telemarketing

81 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b)(3). In addition to its efforts to limit the number of
telemarketing calls consumers receive, the Commission created an exception to the TCPA
for all health care related messages or calls to residential lines that are subject to HIPAA.
The exception exempts these types of calls from the FCC’s consent, identification, time-ofday, opt-out, and abandoned call requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(v).
82 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 1 (2015).
83 Id. at 7989–91 (interpreting 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)).
84 Id. at 7999–8000 (interpreting 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 2015
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7989–90 (2015) (interpreting 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(a)(2)). The Commission even stated that callers cannot “limit the manner in which
revocation may occur.” Id. In other words, as long as the consumer clearly indicates to the
source of the calls (or texts) that he no longer wants to receive them, e.g. by sending a text
message, emailing, or placing a phone call, he has effectively revoked consent.
88 2015
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015) (interpreting 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(1)(A)(2012); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(2)). The FCC also ruled that separate devices
that divide storage and calling functions between two or more companies constitute an
autodialer if, when voluntarily paired together, they can dial random and sequential
numbers. 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015).
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regulations.89 The definition also fails to protect consumers from
intentional TCPA violators and will instead cause further issues
in the form of frivolous TCPA lawsuits.90
II.

THE COMMISSION’S OVERBROAD DEFINITION OF
“AUTODIALER”

A.

The Interpretation of “Capacity”

In the 2015 Order, the FCC expanded the class of
technology that constitutes an autodialer by stating that “the
capacity of an autodialer is not limited to its current configuration
but also includes its potential functionalities.”91 The new scope of
autodialer technology stems from the Commission’s interpretation
of the word “capacity” in the TCPA.92 To identify which devices are
subject to TCPA limits, Congress defined autodialer as “equipment
which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers
to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and
(B) to dial such numbers.”93 Relatedly, the FCC defines “capacity”
within the context of this statutory provision as “the potential or
suitability for holding, storing, or accommodating.”94
The Commission defends the new interpretation in several
ways. For example, it argues that limiting the scope of an
“autodialer” to only technology that is presently configured to
dial “random and sequential numbers”95 would undermine
Congress’s intent to maintain a “broad definition of autodialer.”96
Relatedly, the Commission states that modern technologies are
easy to modify, so with little “effort and cost” a device could be
easily transformed into an autodialer.97 The 2015 Order notes
that there are “outer limits” to the potential capacity of a piece of
89 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
90 The Commission released its most recent TCPA declaratory rulings in July
2016. See FCC 16-72, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 31 FCC Rcd. 7394 (2016); In re Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 31 FCC Rcd. 9054 (2016).
One ruling exempts the federal government and contractors acting within agency scope
from the TCPA. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 31 FCC Rcd. 7394 (2016). The other says that schools can make
robocalls related to an “emergency purpose” to wireless phones without violating the TCPA.
See id. at 9054.
91 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015).
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A), (B) (“The term ‘automatic telephone dialing
system’ means equipment which has the capacity to . . . .” (emphasis added)).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7975 (2015) (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 7974.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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equipment to become an autodialer,98 but the Commission declined
to provide a comprehensive list of which types of equipment fall
within the scope of the definition under the TCPA.99
In addition to justifying its interpretation of “capacity,” the
Commission also addressed commenters’ concerns regarding the
broader scope of technology now governed by the TCPA. Several
commenters100 noted that the Commission’s interpretation of
“‘capacity’ could potentially sweep in smartphones” because they
can be modified to store and dial telephone numbers “through the
use of an app or other software.”101 The Commission dismissed
these concerns, arguing it has defined “‘capacity’ broadly” since
before smartphones were in widespread use, and has found no
evidence that consumers will sue friends or relatives based on
“typical use of smartphone technology.”102 This argument fails—
the Commission has never definitively stated that smartphones
constituted “autodialers,” and these changed circumstances will
make lawsuits between consumers for typical smartphone use
far more likely.
Smartphones aside, the FCC’s expansive interpretation
of capacity unreasonably broadens the definition of “autodialer.”
This new definition does not comport with Congress’s intent to
limit autodialer use in a reasonable manner. This is evidenced
by (1) a plain reading of the statute103 and transcripts of
congressional hearings,104 and (2) the interpretation’s discord
with recent court decisions that accurately interpreted the
TCPA.105 These sources indicate that from both a judicial and
legislative standpoint, the term “capacity” was not meant to
include devices with potential autodialer capabilities, and the
Commission erred by interpreting it as such.

See id. at 7975.
Id. at 7974–95. The Commission used the example of a rotary-dial phone,
stating that such a device would be “too attenuated” to qualify as an autodialer, but
otherwise failed to provide more details regarding the limits of their interpretation.
Id. at 7975.
100 Some commenters included PACE, TextMe, Chamber, iPacesetters, Nicor,
and YouMail. Id. at 7976 n.77.
101 Id. at 7976.
102 Id. The Commission indicated it would “continue to monitor . . . consumer
complaints . . . feedback, as well as private litigation.” Id.
103 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A) (2012).
104 See Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131 and H.R.
2184 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
105 See, e.g. Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., No. C 11–2584 PJH, 2015 WL 475111, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015); Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (W.D. Wash.
2014); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1291–92 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
98

99
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Congress Intended a Narrower Definition for
“Autodialer”

The FCC’s definition of capacity does not reflect Congress’s
intent at the time it drafted the TCPA. A plain reading of the
statutory language reveals that Congress intended “capacity” to
reference a device’s present capabilities, not potential ones.
Congress used present tense when it defined “automatic telephone
dialing system” in the TCPA.106 According to the statute,
equipment that “has the capacity” to produce, store, and dial
randomized telephone numbers constitutes an autodialer—the
language does not expressly include equipment that “could have
the capacity”107 to perform autodialer functions.108 Additionally,
the language does not “implicate[ ] future or theoretical
alterations” like the Commission’s new interpretation.109 Congress
did not include language in the TCPA that indicates “capacity”
refers to devices that could someday be transformed into
autodialers.110 As FCC Commissioner Pai suggested, if Congress
wanted to define autodialers “more broadly it could have done so
by adding [different] tenses and moods, defining it as ‘equipment
which has, has had, or could have the capacity.’ But it didn’t.”111
In addition to the language in the statute, legislative
history demonstrates that Congress did not intend the TCPA to
restrict common use of everyday devices, such as smartphones,
or burden legitimate businesses with increased litigation. The
transcript from a congressional hearing112 about autodialers and
telemarketing concerns indicates that Congress did not intend
“to impose unreasonable burdens on telemarketers or to ban
the appropriate uses of [autodialers].”113 Instead, it sought “to
protect the legitimate privacy rights of consumers . . . public
safety, and . . . provide businesses and individuals appropriate
106 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A); Desai et al., supra note 36, at 81; see also
Gragg, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (declining to expand the definition of “autodialer” under
the TCPA to include equipment that “merely has the potential to store or produce
telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator”).
107 See Desai et al., supra note 36, at 81 (emphasis added).
108 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A).
109 Desai et al., supra note 36, at 81.
110 See 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015).
111 Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8075 (2015).
112 While
discussing several bills regarding telemarketing, facsimile
advertising, and the use of autodialers, Congressman Markey, former chairman of the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
indicated that he did not want to burden telemarketers with statutory regulations. See
Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131 and H.R. 2184 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. 2
(1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
113 Id.
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tools for expressing their own choice about what they want to
hear and read.”114 The FCC’s latest interpretation of “capacity”
does not comport with this mission. The Commission stated in
the 2015 Order that it believed Congress wanted to employ a
broad meaning for “capacity” in the TCPA’s autodialer
definition.115 Legislative history, however, suggests that
Congress was concerned with autodialers’ ability to tie up phone
lines and endanger consumers,116 and proves that Congress
intended to interpret “capacity” more narrowly than the
Commission suggests.
It may be helpful to contextualize Congress’s concern
regarding autodialers by examining what constituted an
“autodialer” when it began drafting the statute in the late
1980s. In 1989, an “automatic dialing system” was a machine
that could “automatically dial up to 1,000 phones per day to
deliver a pre-recorded message.”117 The late 1980s saw some
advances in autodialer technology.118 Senators noted that “new”
technological advancements enabled autodialers to massdeliver prerecorded messages.119 One of Congress’s greatest
concerns regarding new autodialer capabilities was that they
frequently blocked telephone lines, which was dangerous for
consumers in emergency situations.120
Numerous Congressional meetings from the late 1980s
establish that protecting emergency lines and consumer privacy
were a priority for Congress. Senators introduced legislation to
“ban all autodialer calls to the telephone lines of hospitals, fire
departments, and police stations” because autodialers had
frequently tied up these types of emergency numbers.121 Congress
expressly noted that “[o]nce a phone connection is made,
automatic dialing systems can ‘seize’ a recipient’s telephone
line and not release it until the prerecorded message is played,
even when the called party hangs up. This capability makes
these systems not only intrusive, but, in an emergency,

Id.
2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7974 (2015).
116 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 11 (1991).
117 See Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131 and H.R.
2184 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
101st Cong. 1 (1989).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10.
121 Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; The Telephone
Advertising Consumer Protection Act; and Equal Billing For Long Distance Charges,
Hearing on S. 1462, S. 1410 and S. 857 Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 102d Cong. 6 (1991) (statement of Senator Pressler).
114
115
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potentially dangerous as well.”122 In presentations made to
Congress, several speakers supported limiting autodialer use for
this very reason. Robert Bulmash, a representative of Private
Citizen, Inc.,123 advocated for limited autodialer use before
Congress due to consumer privacy and safety concerns.124 As
part of his presentation, Bulmash recounted an incident where
“an autodialer . . . . called folks who were trying to call an
ambulance for their father-in-law” and tied up their phone
line.125 Michael Frawley, an employee in the telecommunications
business,126 described that autodialers “seize[d] up [the] blocks of
numbers” his company tried to reach, and noted that “[t]he
Coast Guard, national defense organizations, police, fire
department, hospitals, [and] doctors . . . [were] all affected” by
autodialers.127 Congress considered this testimony when it
drafted the TCPA in 1991.
Congress’s concern about autodialers seizing phone
lines proves that the Commission’s new interpretation is
overbroad.128 According to the Commission, devices constitute
autodialers even if they are not configured to store, produce,
and dial random numbers,129 however, this cannot be what
Congress intended when it drafted the TCPA. How could a
device, such as a smartphone, tie up an emergency line if it is
not presently configured to do so? It could not. The autodialer
devices that concerned Congress at the time of the enactment
were those presently capable of tying up phone lines, or storing,
producing, and dialing mass amounts of phone numbers. If the
devices were not configured as autodialers, they would not be
able to tie up phone lines in emergency situations, and
therefore would not pose the threat to consumers that worried
Congress. If Congress expressed a broader concern regarding
autodialer use, such as a fear that companies should not have
powerful communication devices, perhaps the Commission’s
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10.
Private Citizen, Inc., is an organization “dedicated to protecting the
privacy of citizens in [an] increasingly technological era.” Automated Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991; The Telephone Advertising Consumer Protection Act;
and Equal Billing For Long Distance Charges, Hearing on S. 1462, S. 1410 and S. 857
Before the Subcomm. on Comm’ns of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 102d
Cong. 13 (1991) (statement of Robert Bulmash, Private Citizen, Inc.).
124 Id. at 16.
125 Id.
126 Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing on H.R. 130 and H.R. 1305 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong.
110 (1991) (statement of Michael J. Frawley, Gold Coast Paging).
127 Id. at 110–11.
128 See id.
129 See supra Section II.A.
122

123
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“capacity” interpretation would be more appropriate. This would
necessitate a broader limitation on autodialer use, and potentially
include devices that could later be made into autodialers.
Congress, however, expressed no such concern here, and only
seemed focused on the present ability of autodialers. As a result,
it is clear that Congress intended to apply “capacity” to the
autodialer definition in a present context.
C.

Recent Court Decisions Support a Narrower
Interpretation of “Capacity”

The Commission’s interpretation of “capacity” conflicts
with several recent court decisions regarding autodialer
technology.130 Prior to the 2015 Order, courts have refused to
include equipment with “merely the potential” to perform
autodialer functions.131 In Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
a Ninth Circuit class action suit, the plaintiffs asserted that
the defendant sent them promotional texts that violated the
TCPA.132 At the summary judgment phase, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court, finding an issue of
material fact as to whether the device the defendant used to
send the texts constituted an autodialer.133 The court reasoned
that the district court focused on the wrong inquiry, and should
have considered “whether the equipment has the capacity” to
perform autodialer functions.134 This holding makes clear that
130 Interestingly, in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that the FCC’s TCPA orders were “hardly a model
of clarity.” Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 Fed. App’x 369, 372 (3d Cir. 2015).
131 See, e.g., Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., No. C 11–2584 PJH, 2015 WL 475111, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (“[T]he relevant inquiry under the TCPA is whether a
defendant’s equipment has the present capacity to perform autodialing functions.”
(emphasis added)); Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (W.D.
Wash. 2014) (“The Court declines to expand the definition of an ATDS to cover equipment
that merely has the potential to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or
sequential number generator or to dial telephone numbers from a list without human
intervention.”); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.
Cal. 2014) (declining to expand the definition of autodialers to include devices with
potential capacity to perform the necessary functions because “[i]t seems unlikely that
Congress intended to subject such a wide swath of the population to a law designed to
combat unwanted and excessive telemarketing”).
132 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). The
device defendants used stored phone numbers in a database along with the promotional
messages, and could be programmed to send the messages to recipients. Id. at 949.
133 Id. at 951.
134 Id. The decision was based on the distinction between a device’s capacity to
do something and how the device is actually used. Id. at 951. The court stated that “a
system need not actually store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially generated
telephone numbers” to violate the TCPA—but it must “have the capacity” to do so. Id.
(emphases added). The court’s “capacity” interpretation is in the present context—even if
a device may not be used at the time to perform autodialer functions, it must presently be
able to perform those functions to constitute an autodialer.
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defendants must “argue that their systems lack the actual ability
to [perform autodialer functions] in order to demonstrate that
their systems do not qualify as [autodialers].”135 Later decisions in
the Ninth Circuit have interpreted Satterfield to both support and
require “an interpretation of the word ‘capacity’ to mean [nothing]
more than ‘is capable of.’”136
Other courts have also interpreted “capacity” in a present
context rather than a future or potential one.137 For example, in
Bates v. Dollar Loan Center, the District Court of Nevada held
that the defendant’s device constituted an autodialer because it
stored numbers and could dial them automatically if the
defendant “dump[ed] the relevant telephone numbers into [a]
‘pool.’”138 The court focused on the “current capacity” of defendant’s
equipment to determine whether it was an autodialer.139 Further,
in Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., the Northern District of California
found “that the relevant inquiry under the TCPA is whether a
defendant’s equipment has the present capacity to perform
autodialing functions, even if those functions were not actually
used.”140 The court, like other district courts, interpreted
“capacity” in the present context.
Relatedly, courts have reasoned that “capacity” must be
interpreted in a present context because otherwise, the term
autodialer would have no “outer limit.”141 For example, in
Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., the District Court for the Western
District of Washington declined to hold that “capacity” includes
devices with potential to perform autodialer functions because
“[e]quipment that requires alteration to perform those
functions may in the future be capable, but it does not currently
have that capacity.”142 The court held that expanding the
Desai et al., supra note 36, at 78 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Gragg, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (emphasis added) (Satterfield “did
not involve a situation in which it was clear that the system could not perform the
functions of a predictive dialer unless it were modified or altered in some way. There is
no indication that the Ninth Circuit would deem a system that has to be reprogrammed
or have new software installed in order to perform the functions of an [autodialer] to be
an [autodialer].”); Bates v. Dollar Loan Ctr., LLC, No. 2:13–CV–1731–KJD–CWH, 2014
WL 3516260, at *2 (D. Nev. July 15, 2014) (finding that a device constituted an
autodialer by considering its present configuration).
137 See, e.g., Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., No. C 11–2584 PJH, 2015 WL 475111, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015); Bates, 2014 WL 3516260, at *2; Gragg, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
138 Bates, 2014 WL 3516260, at *2.
139 Id.
140 Glauser, 2015 WL 475111, at *4 (emphasis added).
141 De Los Santos v. Millward Brown, Inc., No. 13–80670–CV, 2014 WL 2938605,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2014); see also Hunt v. 21st Mortg. Corp., 2:12-CV-2697-WMA,
2013 WL 5230061, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 2013) (finding an issue of material fact as to
whether a device constituted an autodialer under the TCPA when it could become one after
software was installed).
142 Gragg, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (emphasis added).
135

136
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definition would subject all computers and everyday technology
to TCPA restrictions, which is “a result Congress surely did not
intend.”143 Similarly, in De Los Santos v. Millward Brown, the
Southern District of Florida held that the TCPA did not
expressly apply the “autodialer” restrictions to everyday
technologies such as smartphones and computers.144 In Hunt v.
21st Mortgage Corp., the Northern District of Alabama stated
that the TCPA provides no support for defendant’s argument
that use of an iPhone falls under the umbrella of the TCPA.145 In
that case, the defendant’s argument failed because “[v]irtually
every telephone in existence, given a team of sophisticated
engineers working doggedly to modify it, could possibly” perform
autodialer functions.146 These decisions all declined to expand
the autodialer definition to include devices not presently
configured to perform autodialer functions.
The Commission broke with this precedent and adopted a
broad interpretation of “capacity” that several courts had
previously declined to implement. While these courts’ narrow
approach is not unanimous,147 it is clear that many judges foresaw
the issues that a broad interpretation of capacity would impose on
consumers and businesses, and intended to strike an appropriate
balance between protecting consumers and preserving companies’
ability to conduct legitimate business.148 Thus, the Commission’s
interpretation of “capacity” runs contrary to both judicial history
and congressional intent.

Id.
De Los Santos, 2014 WL 2938605, at *6.
145 Hunt, 2013 WL 5230061, at *4.
146 Hunt v. 21st Mortg. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-2697-WMA, 2014 WL 426275, at *5
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2014). “The TCPA surely does not mean to define every telephone as
an automatic dialing system, and does not subject every call made to a cell phone to
liability by the caller.” Id.
147 See, e.g., Griffith v. Consumer Portfolio Serv., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 723,
727 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that all predictive dialers constitute autodialers, even if
they lack present capacity to perform autodialer functions).
148 See In re Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (S.D. Cal. 2012);
Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2014); see also
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
143
144
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III.

THE PROBLEMATIC EFFECT OF THE COMMISSION’S
AUTODIALER DEFINITION

A.

The Broader Definition Inadequately Addresses the
Increase in Intentional Telemarketing Violations

The Commission’s unreasonably broad autodialer
definition does not adequately tackle one of the biggest
telemarketing issues consumers face—intentional, and possibly
malicious, TCPA violators.149 In his statement regarding the
2015 Order, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler discussed two
consumers that complained to the Commission about receiving
unwanted telemarketing calls.150 He first mentioned Brian, who
complained that robocalls affected his productivity because they
were “a daily occurrence on both [his] landline, and . . . mobile
number.”151 He then described Peggy, who stated that she had
medical issues, “live[d] in a large home,” and that robocalls
“cause[d] [her] to stress out because [she couldn’t] get to the
phone.”152 These were only two of more than 215,000
telemarketing complaints that poured into the Commission that
year.153 Many disgruntled consumers have likely received calls
from companies that are illegitimate, intend to defraud them, or
deliberately disregard the TCPA and the National Do Not Call
Registry.154 The Commission’s expansion of what constitutes an
“autodialer” will do little to protect Brian, Peggy, and other
disgruntled consumers from such annoying and potentially
harmful telemarketing calls.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) works with the
FCC to help prevent malicious telemarketing calls from harming
consumers.155 The FTC is a bipartisan federal agency that seeks
to “protect consumers and promote competition.”156 With respect

See Waller et al., supra note 8, at 388.
See Wheeler Statement, 30 FCC Rcd 8066 (2015).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See Lauren Silverman, FTC Offers $50,000 Reward to Help Stop Robocalls,
NPR (Jan. 02, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/02/168444025/reward-offered-to-help-stoprobocalls [https://perma.cc/Y3RB-VZFP]; Sid Kirchheimer, Stop Spam Text Messages, AARP
(Oct. 3, 2012) http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-10-2012/stop-spam-textmessages.html [https://perma.cc/R94F-S8PX].
155 There are two main classes of entities that violate the TCPA—”(1) those that
unknowingly or unintentionally violate the [statute]; and (2) those that intentionally
violate the [statute].” Waller et al., supra note 8, at 388 (footnote omitted).
156 What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/5U36-6RCL]. Its mission is “[t]o prevent business practices that are
anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to consumers . . . and to accomplish this without
149

150
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to telemarketing issues, the FTC has two important roles: it
maintains the Do Not Call List and conducts investigations to
stop “unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices.”157 Recent FTC
data indicate that the number of entities that pay to access the
National Do Not Call Registry has decreased.158 Additionally, the
number of companies that engage in legitimate telemarketing
practices is on the decline,159 while consumer telemarketing
complaints have continued to increase each year.160 These facts
indicate that the number of entities that intentionally disregard
the TCPA “appears to be on the rise.”161
Entities that intentionally violate the TCPA pose a
serious threat to consumers. Some entities knowingly violate
the statute merely because it may be the most economical
means of advertising their businesses.162 However, others have
a darker motive—they intend to commit fraud or scam money
from consumers.163 In 2012, North American cell phones
received around 45 million spam text messages.164
Approximately “70 percent of all cellphone text spam is
designed to defraud [consumers] in some way.”165 Much of the
spam is capable of installing malware programs on consumers’
cell phones to collect any personal data stored in their
devices.166 The infringing entity can then use that data to steal
personal and financial information from consumers, and if it so
chooses, sell the data to third parties or steal consumers’
identities.167 According to the FTC, spam phone calls are also
an issue.168 Most pre-recorded telemarketing calls are “scams
that prey on people who are economically vulnerable.”169
unduly burdening legitimate business activity.” About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [https://perma.cc/AE47-NCYM].
157 What We Do, supra note 156.
158 FTC data shows that between 2011 and 2015, the number of entities who
paid for access to the National Do Not Call Registry decreased from 3,192 to 2,504.
NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, supra note 8, at 8.
159 Waller et al., supra note 8, at 388. This is supported by the FCC’s requirement
that companies seeking to engage in telemarketing practices pay to access the National Do
Not Call Registry. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14032 n.103 (2003).
160 NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, supra note 8, at 4. Forty percent of the
FCC’s consumer complaints in 2014 were related to “[u]nwanted telemarketing calls in
violation of the National Do-Not-Call Registry.” Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8072 (2015).
161 Waller et al., supra note 8, at 388.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Kirchheimer, supra note 154.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Silverman, supra note 154.
169 Id. Many of these calls offer promotions for free trips, or falsely claim there are
issues with a consumer’s bank account or medication. See Kirchheimer, supra note 154.
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The new autodialer definition will not help consumers
guard themselves against purposeful, or dangerous, TCPA
offenders because it is very difficult to enforce the statute
against them. Due to recent technological advancements, the FCC
and FTC have had difficulty tracking down some of the most
vicious robocallers.170 A growing number of robocalls are made
from outside the United States and the callers are “capable of
blasting out an unfathomable number of telephone calls.”171 For
example, in 2012, the FTC stopped an overseas dialer called Asia
Pacific, which made more than 2.5 billion autodialed
telemarketing calls in the United States in an eighteen-month
period.172 Furthermore, deliberate infringers have found ways to
evade FTC and FCC enforcement measures—the FTC estimated
in 2012 that it could not “trace or block about 59% of phone
spam”173 because the callers masked themselves with “automatic
dialers, caller ID spoofing and voice-over-Internet protocols.”174
This essentially renders the expanded autodialer definition
useless; while its intended purpose is to give consumers more
ammunition to enforce the TCPA against annoying callers, it
fails to protect them from the most dangerous callers because
they are simply too hard to find.
B.

Increased Litigation as a Consequence of the New
Interpretation

The Commission’s new autodialer definition will shift
enforcement efforts away from purposeful TCPA violators and
towards companies and consumers that unintentionally violate
the statute through the course of harmless, or even helpful,
communication.175 Recent trends in TCPA litigation show that
TCPA lawsuits are clogging the judicial system.176 These lawsuits
attract plaintiffs’ attorneys because they frequently provide
lucrative class-action settlement opportunities.177 Furthermore,
Silverman, supra note 154.
Id.
172 See id.; see also FCC v. Asia Pac. Telecom, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782
(N.D. Ill. 2011). Asia Pacific’s principal places of business are Kowlon, Hong Kong, and
Almere, Netherlands. Id.
173 See Laura J. Nelson, FTC Hangs Up on Robocalls from ‘Rachel’, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/01/business/la-fi-tn-ftc-robocalls-creditcard-services-20121101 [https://perma.cc/U8G2-M9ZX].
174 Id.
175 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
176 Desai et al., supra note 36, at 77.
177 See Adonis Hoffman, Sorry, Wrong Number, Now Pay Up, WALL STREET J.
(June 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sorry-wrong-number-now-pay-up-1434409610
[https://perma.cc/JQL4-5NW4] (“In the past two years, TCPA lawsuits have extracted large
settlements from companies . . . . Plaintiffs’ lawyers received an average of $2.4 million.”).
170
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the statute imposes strict liability, which makes it easier for
plaintiffs to collect damages from defendants that violate the
TCPA, even if they do so unintentionally.178 Relatedly, the
Commission and several courts have held that companies “may be
held vicariously liable” for TCPA violations conducted by their
third-party agents.179 Given that autodialers now include
everyday technological devices such as smartphones, companies
and consumers are more likely to unintentionally violate the
TCPA.180 Plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumers will be further
incentivized to bring lawsuits and profit from these mistakes, and
the new spectrum of autodialer technology will only make it
easier to bring TCPA suits against legitimate businesses and,
potentially, individual consumers.181
1. Recent Trends in TCPA Litigation
The TCPA is a heavily litigated statute that is sure to
be the subject of even more lawsuits as a result of the 2015
Order. Businesses have expressed concern regarding increased
litigation costs since the FCC released the 2015 Order.182 This
concern has merit given recent TCPA litigation trends.183 The
TCPA “has become one of the favorite vehicles for class-action
lawsuits against companies that seek to communicate with
their customers, clients, patrons or patients using automated
or predictive dialing technology.”184 In fact, TCPA lawsuits have
already increased dramatically in recent years.185 In 2013,
TCPA lawsuits increased by 70% compared to the number filed
in 2012.186 Further, the number of TCPA lawsuits increased

178 Waller et al., supra note 8, at 422; see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(C),
(c)(5)(A)–(C) (2012).
179 See In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013) [hereinafter
2013 Order]; see also Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 765, 775 (N.D.
Ill. 2014); Roylance v. ALG Real Estate Servs., Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02445-PSG, 2015 WL
1522244, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015); Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., 12 F.
Supp. 3d 1292, 1298 (D. Nev. 2014); Mey v. Monitronics Int’l Inc., 959 F. Supp. 2d 927, 931
(N.D. W. Va. 2013).
180 See supra Section II.A.
181 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073, 8076 (2015).
182 See Blaine C. Kimrey et al., What Do Recent TCPA Incantations by FCC Mean
for You? (FCC TCPA Order Report Parts 10 & 11 of 11—the Dissents and the Big Picture),
THE NAT’L LAW REVIEW (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-dorecent-tcpa-incantations-fcc-mean-you-fcc-tcpa-order-report-parts-10-11-11 [https://perma.
cc/GYG8-HSPT].
183 Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015); see Hoffman, supra note 177.
184 Hoffman, supra note 177.
185 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7969–70 (2015).
186 Id.
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“from 14 in 2008 to 1,908 in the first nine months of 2014.”187
These lawsuits frequently “extract[] large settlements from
companies”188 that provide millions in attorneys’ fees for counsel,
and much less for consumers.189 The 2015 Order ignored
businesses’ requests for relief from such potentially expensive
litigation190 and as a result, a lawsuit is pending before the D.C.
Circuit seeking review of several aspects of the 2015 Order.191
The Commission’s new interpretation will only further increase
the number of TCPA lawsuits and cost businesses and
consumers a lot of money for simply using everyday technology.
2. Incentives for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys to Bring TCPA
Class Actions
i.

Financial Incentives

Plaintiffs’ attorneys are financially incentivized to pursue
TCPA lawsuits. Courts in several jurisdictions have held that
typical attorneys’ fees should fall between twenty percent and
thirty percent of the total settlement amount.192 In many TCPA
class action lawsuits, this percentage can amount to millions of
dollars for attorneys, while consumer class members receive far
less. This data support Commissioner Pai’s assertion that the
Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015); see Hoffman, supra note 177.
Hoffman, supra note 177.
189 These lawsuits are typically class action suits. See infra Section III.B.2.i
for examples of such lawsuits.
190 See Hoffman, supra note 177.
191 ACA International, along with sixteen other petitioners, have filed suit in
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to challenge several aspects of
the 2015 Order, including the Commission’s new autodialer definition. See Statement
of Issues at 2–3, ACA Int’l, et al. v. FCC, No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2015). On January 15,
2016, the Commission filed a reply brief in support of their 2015 Order. Brief for
Respondents at 1, ACA Int’l, et al. v. FCC, No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The parties
presented their oral arguments on October 19, 2016. Order at 1, ACA Int’l, et al. v.
FCC, No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Furthermore, several courts have stayed TCPA
cases pending the D.C. Circuit’s decision. See, e.g., Acton v. Intellectual Capital Mgmt.,
15-CV-4004(JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 9462110, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015); Kolloukian v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 15-2856-PSG-JEM, 2015 WL 9598782, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
14, 2015); Fontes v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-02060-(CASx), 2014 WL
2153919, at *2, (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2014); Luster v. Jewelers, 1:15-cv-2854-WSD, 2015
WL 9255553, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2015).
192 See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that attorneys’ fees typically range between 20-30%, and that the “‘bench
mark’ percentage for the fee award should be 25 percent”); Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (“The majority of common fund fee awards fall
between 20% to 30% of the fund.”); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 395, 404
(D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the award plaintiffs requested was “within or below the normal
range of 20 to 30 per cent [sic] of the class recovery for fee awards in this type of litigation”);
Rosenfeld v. Black, 56 F.R.D. 604, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“Traditionally, courts in this district
and elsewhere have awarded fees in the range of 20% to 30% of the recovery.”).
187
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likely increase in litigation will greatly benefit attorneys and
not consumers.193
Several recent TCPA settlements demonstrate that the
twenty to thirty percent fee range is a considerable amount for
attorneys, and tends to leave consumers with a much lower
award. In Santos v. Millward Brown, plaintiffs and Millward
Brown reached a settlement in which Millward Brown agreed to
pay up to $11,000,000 to prevent further litigation regarding
alleged TCPA violations.194 Here, the attorneys received 25% of
the settlement, or $2,750,000, and consumers collected “up to
$50.”195 In Couser v. Comenity Bank, plaintiffs’ attorneys collected
$1,271,250 from a total settlement of $8,475,000 while consumers
collected $14.28 each.196 In Wilkins v. HSBC, plaintiffs’ attorneys
negotiated a settlement of $39,975,000, from which they collected
$9,495,000,197 leaving the class members with $20 to $40 each.198
In Rose v. Bank of America, the court approved a settlement
agreement that awarded plaintiffs $32,083,905,199 of which each
consumer in the class received $20 to $40 and the attorneys
collected $8,020,076.200 These settlements201 demonstrate that
attorneys will be financially incentivized to pursue TCPA lawsuits
because they have notoriously provided a high return in
attorneys’ fees.
Attorneys’ fees are designed to compensate lawyers for
the work they put into lawsuits202—and there is no question
Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
See Settlement Agreement at 3, De Los Santos v. Millward Brown, 2014
WL 2938605 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2015) (No. 9:13-cv-80670-DPG).
195 Karina Basso, Millward Brown TCPA Class Action Settlement, TOP CLASS
ACTIONS (Mar. 20, 2015), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/closed-settlements/
52177-millward-brown-tcpa-class-action-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/HGU9-69Q5].
196 Order Granting Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Granting in Part Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees at 21 n.3, Couser
v. Comenity Bank, (S.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:12-cv-02484-MMA-BGS), https://eclaim.kccllc.net/
caclaimforms/cyc/Documents/SettlementAgreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UYH-DSB9].
197 Memorandum Opinion and Order at *10, Wilkins v. HSBC Bank, 2015 WL
890566 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2015) (1:14-cv-00190).
198 Id.
199 See Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF AM. TCPA SETTLEMENT, https://
www. boatcpasettlement.com/en/Home/FAQ#faq5 [https://perma.cc/FPT2-325Q].
200 Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, 18, Rose. v. Bank of America, No.
5:11-cv-02390 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.boatcpasettlement.com/Content/
Documents/Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JP8-3EFD].
201 See also Papa John’s to Pay $16.335 Million to Settle TCPA Class Action,
KLEIN, MOYNIHAN, TURCO, LLP, http://www.kleinmoynihan.com/papa-johns-to-pay-16-335million-to-settle-tcpa-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/UK8E-RK5Y] (Papa John’s had to pay
up to $16,000,000 in a TCPA settlement, and the attorneys collected $2,450,000 in fees.).
202 Attorneys generally request fees as compensation for their efforts litigating
a case. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Service
Award at 3–6, Allen v. JP Morgan, 2010 WL 1325321 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 1:13-cv-08285),
https://eclaim.kccllc.net/caclaimforms/jpa/Documents/JPA-MOL-SupportAttorneys-Fees
CostsServiceAward.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA77-RVDT].
193
194
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that attorneys are entitled to collect them. As Commissioner
Pai points out, however, the lawyers that bring TCPA class action
suits typically do not target “the illegal telemarketers, the overthe-phone scam artists, [or] the foreign fraudsters.”203 Instead,
they are attracted to “legitimate, domestic businesses”204 because
they are easier to find205 and more profitable.206 The new scope of
autodialer technology will only make legitimate transactions
between businesses and consumers more likely to violate the
TCPA,207 and when plaintiffs’ attorneys consider how much they
are likely to collect in a class action settlement, and how easily
they can establish that a defendant violated the TCPA, they will
likely bring more lawsuits.
ii. TCPA Suits Have a High Likelihood of Success
The nature of TCPA lawsuits further incentivizes
plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue them because they are likely to
win.208 The statute “combines strict liability, statutory damages,
and the class action mechanism to . . . incentivize . . . consumers
to prosecute violations.”209 The TCPA requires only that a
plaintiff show the defendant violated the statute in order to
recover damages.210 Furthermore, if the plaintiff can show that
the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the statute, he can
potentially receive treble damages.211 As a result, once a plaintiff
can establish that an entity texted or called him in violation of
the TCPA, he is highly likely to recover.
Both courts and the FCC have found companies
vicariously liable for TCPA violations, making it more likely that
plaintiffs will be successful in lawsuits against defendants with
deep pockets. In a 2013 declaratory ruling, the Commission held
that companies could be vicariously liable based on principles of
agency law for TCPA violations.212 Courts have followed this
Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
Id.
205 Take, for example, Asia Pacific—an overseas dialer that the FTC stopped
after it made deceptive robocalls to “tens of millions of consumers” in the United States.
FCC v. Asia Pac. Telecom, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (internal
quotations omitted). The FTC has difficulty tracking down overseas dialers like Asia
Pacific. See Silverman, supra note 154.
206 Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
207 Id.
208 “The best way for any marketer or advertiser to succeed in a TCPA class
action is to never be named in a TCPA class action lawsuit.” Papa John’s to Pay $16.335
million to Settle TCPA Class Action, supra note 201.
209 Waller et al., supra note 8, at 422.
210 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(5)(A)–(C) (2012).
211 See id.
212 2013 Order, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013).
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204
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ruling, and examine the extent to which the principal entity
had control over the third-party telemarketers that called on
their behalf.213 Generally, plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that a
defendant was vicariously liable for third party TCPA violations
when they established that (1) a principal/agent relationship
existed, and/or (2) the principal company was able to control the
telemarketing practices of the third-party telemarketers.214
Courts have also held companies vicariously liable for thirdparty telemarketing violations without referencing the
Commission’s declaratory ruling.215
The nature of TCPA suits, when combined with the new
autodialer definition, increases the likelihood that companies
or consumers will inadvertently violate the TCPA.216 Since the
TCPA imposes strict liability, there will be an increased
incentive for companies to settle217 in order to mitigate litigation
costs. These factors, when combined, increase the likelihood that
TCPA lawsuits will be successful for plaintiffs’ attorneys, and
will incentivize them to pursue such lawsuits against defendants
that are not purposeful or harmful TCPA violators.

213 See, e.g., Toney v. Quality Res., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727, 742 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (“[P]laintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make it plausible that Quality was
acting as Sempris’s agent when it placed the calls at issue.”).
214 Id. at 727–23; see also Roylance v. ALG Real Estate Servs., Inc., No. 5:14-cv02445-PSG, 2015 WL 1522244, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (finding defendant
vicariously liable for a TCPA violation because plaintiff established that defendant gave
the third-party caller “apparent authority to conduct telemarketing on its behalf”); Smith
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 765, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding
defendant vicariously liable where defendants “directed the quality, timing, and volume
of [agent’s] telemarketing calls”); Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., 12 F. Supp. 3d
1292, 1302 (D. Nev. 2014) (certifying the proposed class) (“Kristensen has sufficiently
pleaded a plausible agency relationship based on actual authority . . . , apparent
authority . . . and ratification . . . .”); Mey v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 2d 927,
932 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment where
plaintiff alleged “more than a scintilla of evidence” that an agency relationship existed).
215 See, e.g., Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2014);
Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 582 Fed. App’x 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2014); McCabe v. Caribbean
Cruise Line, Inc., No. 13-CV-6131, 2014 WL 3014874, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Hartley-Culp v.
Green Tree Servicing, LLC., 52 F. Supp. 3d 700, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Bridgeview Health
Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, No. 09 C 5601, 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013).
216 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8073 (2015).
217 Mayer Brown LLP conducted a study in 2009 that examined 148 federal
class action cases, 127 of which were resolved by the time the study closed on
September 1, 2013. See MAYER BROWN LLP, DO CLASS ACTIONS BENEFIT CLASS
MEMBERS?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTIONS 3 (2009), https://www.mayer
brown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClass
Members.pdf [https://perma.cc/39JM-VS3Z]. Only 31% of these cases were dismissed on
the merits—35% were settled “on an individual basis,” and 33% were settled on a “classwide basis.” Id. at 1–2, 4.
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C.

Consumers May Become the New Target for TCPA
Lawsuits

While attorneys are likely more inclined to target
businesses in future TCPA lawsuits, the new interpretation could
also affect consumers’ role in the impending wave of TCPA
lawsuits—consumers may become defendants.218 The Commission
argues that there is no evidence that consumers will sue each
other for everyday use of technology, including texts and phone
calls between family and friends.219 This may be true, but only
because “no one has thought the TCPA prohibited the ordinary
use of smartphones—at least not before now. Now that they do,
the lawsuits are sure to follow.”220 While it is not certain that
plaintiffs will sue friends, family, or strangers for TCPA
violations due to smartphone use, there is nothing stopping
them from doing so.
The statute provides consumers a $500 private right of
action and up to $1,500 if the caller intentionally violated the
TCPA.221 As evidenced above, consumers that opt into TCPA
class action settlements typically recover far less than $500
because they have to share the settlement fund with other class
members and the attorneys representing them.222 Alternatively,
in an action between two private consumers, individual
plaintiffs have the potential to recover more than they would if
they were part of a class action suit against a corporate entity.
As a result of the Commission’s interpretation of “capacity,” an
individual can be held liable under the TCPA if that individual
misdials a number and calls another consumer’s cell phone
instead. Consumers could also sue someone who texted them after
receiving their contact information from a mutual friend. The
bottom line is that everyday communication between two average
American citizens is now subject to lawsuits under a statute that
governs telemarketers who make irritating robocalls. So
consumers, in addition to companies, need to carefully monitor
the technology they use to communicate, or they may find
themselves across the bench from one another in the near future.
This is certainly not what Congress intended when it enacted the
statute in 1991.223

218
219
220
221
222
223

Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8076 (2015).
2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7976–77 (2015).
Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8076 (2015).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(5)(A)–(C) (2012).
See supra Section III.B.2.i.
See supra Section II.B.
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE THREATS POSED BY THE
FCC’S NEW INTERPRETATION

The Commission’s interpretation of “capacity” will be
problematic for companies, consumers, and the courts, but the
Commission has the power to fix it. The FCC defined “capacity”
as “the potential or suitability for holding, storing, or
accommodating.”224 It then interpreted this definition to mean
that any device that can become an autodialer in the future is
currently an autodialer.225 Since the Commission is the agency
Congress assigned to enforce the TCPA, this interpretation is
binding on companies and consumers.226 As a result, everyone
will have to make adjustments to comply. Consumers will have
to triple-check that they are texting or calling the right person
from their iPhones, companies will have to rethink the devices
they use to communicate with clients and customers, and
courts will be clogged with TCPA class action lawsuits against
legitimate, domestic businesses and challenges to the
Commission’s most recent regulations.227 But the Commission
can fix this mistake pursuant to the same power that gave it
the ability to broaden the interpretation. All it has to do is
swallow its pride, pat Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly on the
back for giving the FCC a much-needed scolding, and narrow
the scope of autodialer technology by redefining “capacity.”
Furthermore, to protect consumers from potentially
fraudulent entities that intentionally violate the TCPA, the
Commission should require service carriers to provide a call
blocking service to its consumers so that they can decide whether
they want to block certain categories of phone calls. This would
help consumers shield themselves from annoying or potentially
harmful unsolicited communications until the FCC (or the FTC)
can find a more permanent way to catch intentional TCPA
violators and hold them accountable. This requirement, when
combined with a narrower scope of autodialer technology, would
help protect consumer rights and safety228 while furthering
Congress’s actual intent for the scope of the TCPA.
2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7975 (2015).
Id. at 7976.
226 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2012).
227 ACA International, along with sixteen other petitioners, have filed suit in the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to challenge several aspects of the
2015 Order, including the Commission’s new autodialer definition. See Statement of
Issues at 2–3, ACA Int’l, et al. v. FCC, No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Kimrey et al., supra
note 182. On January 15, 2016, the Commission filed a reply brief in support of their 2015
Order. Brief for Respondent at 1, ACA Int’l, et al. v. FCC, No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
228 1992 Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8753–54 (1992).
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The FCC Should Define “Capacity” to Only Include a
Device’s Present Capability

The Commission must narrow the scope of autodialer
technology in order to fix the problems that are likely to result
from its 2015 TCPA regulations. More specifically, the
Commission should interpret Congress’s use of “capacity” in the
statute to only refer to a device’s present ability.229 This
interpretation would narrow the scope of autodialers to only
include devices presently configured to store, produce, and dial
random or sequential numbers.230 This interpretation is plausible
for several reasons.231 First, a plain reading of the statute and
legislative hearings support the proposed interpretation. Second,
it will enable the Commission and private citizens to pursue
TCPA offenders while protecting legitimate transactions between
businesses and consumers. Finally, it will help prevent frivolous
lawsuits and promote enforcement against purposeful and
malicious TCPA violators.
The language in the TCPA supports that “capacity” refers
only to a device’s present ability. The statute governs devices
that have the capacity to perform autodialer functions.232 When
interpreting this provision of the statute, the FCC emphasized
the word “potential” and concluded that it imposed future
meaning on the statute’s use of “capacity.”233 Nevertheless, there
is a way to interpret “potential,” that does not expand the
autodialer definition to include a device’s hypothetical, future
configurations. The term “potential” should be interpreted to
simply reference a device’s abilities rather than how it is
actually used.234 So, if a device presently has the potential to
perform autodialer functions, it should constitute an autodialer
under the statute, regardless of how the consumer or company
is using it. For example, only smartphones that are configured
See Desai et al., supra note 36, at 81.
See 42 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
231 It is important to note that the Commission is able to re-interpret “capacity”
despite its decision in the 2015 Order. The Commission has changed its mind about
amending TCPA regulations in the past. For example, in 1992 the Commission declined
to adopt a National Do Not Call Registry, 1992 Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8758, 8760 ¶¶ 11, 14
(1992), but then established one in 2003, see 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14033 ¶ 26 (2003).
This shows that the Commission’s prior decisions do not preclude it from making
conflicting ones in the future. Thus, the Commission’s decision in the 2015 Order does not
enjoin it from re-defining “capacity” within the context of the TCPA.
232 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A), (B) (2012).
233 See 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7976 (2015).
234 So, for example, an entity could not escape TCPA liability by arguing that
their autodialer was not used to store, produce, and dial numbers. If a consumer called or
texted another, using a device that presently had autodialer capabilities, he or she would
still be liable under the TCPA.
229

230
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to perform autodialer functions (e.g. those that have downloaded
an autodialer app or other software) would incur liability if used
in violation of the TCPA, even if the phone is not used to
perform those functions. This interpretation comports with the
language in the statute by focusing on a device’s capacity rather
than how it is used but would still limit the number of
smartphones implicated by the TCPA.235
Furthermore, legislative history clearly shows that
Congress sought to protect consumers from the burden of
unwanted autodialer calls, especially ones that tied up phone
lines and prevented emergency services from communicating with
consumers.236 Congress’s concerns regarding consumer safety and
privacy will remain intact if the Commission changes its
interpretation of “capacity” to include devices with only the
present ability to perform autodialer functions. The proposed
interpretation still prohibits entities from using autodialers to
call or text consumers, thus eliminating the threat of nuisance
or blocked telephone lines. Several courts relied on congressional
intent to reach the conclusion that the autodialer definition
should be limited to a device’s present capabilities.237
The proposed interpretation will help protect everyday,
useful communication while enabling the Commission and
consumers to enforce the TCPA when necessary. The
Commission’s broad interpretation unnecessarily ropes in
legitimate communications between businesses and their
consumers238 while doing nothing to incentivize or empower
consumers and the Commission to hold entities accountable for
purposefully violating the statute. The Commission should seek to
protect “expected or desired communications between businesses
and their customers.”239 If “capacity” only includes devices with
the present ability to perform autodialer functions, businesses
will have more notice regarding what devices they may use to
contact consumers. This will allow businesses to take necessary
measures to assure that they do not violate the TCPA, and
make it more difficult for trial attorneys to bring class action
suits against them because they are less likely to violate the
statute. This will also enable the Commission, private
235 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A), (B) (“The term ‘automatic telephone dialing
system’ means equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone
numbers to be called . . . and (B) to dial such numbers.” (emphasis added)).
236 See Desai et al., supra note 36, at 75–77; Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on
H.R. 628, H.R. 2131, and H.R. 2184 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. 6, at 1–3 (1989).
237 See supra Section II.C.
238 See Pai Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8076 (2015).
239 Id.
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consumers, and the courts to focus their enforcement efforts on
entities that purposefully violate the TCPA. The interpretation
will promote judicial economy, save consumers and businesses
a lot of money, and keep the focus of TCPA litigation in the
right place—away from legitimate communication between
businesses and consumers.
B.

The FCC Should Require Carriers to Develop CallBlocking Technology

The Commission has long emphasized that “consumers
have a right to block calls.”240 While the Commission does not
mandate a consumer-controlled blocking service,241 the 2015
Order states that there are no barriers for providers to
implement call-blocking options for consumers and encourages
them to do so.242 Furthermore, the FTC has offered rewards to
any individual or small company that could devise a solution to
block illegal robocalls.243 These contests have led to several
proposed solutions,244 but as the FCC notes in the 2015 Order,
“the efficacy of [these] call-blocking technolog[ies]” are an
issue.245 While current call-blocking technology is not perfect,246
the FCC praised the current options that some carriers are
2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8035 (2015).
Id. at 8036. AT&T expressed concern that call-blocking technologies would
result in the “inadvertent blocking of non-robocallers.” Id. at 8037. However, they are
working on ways to improve call-blocking technology for consumers. See Quinn,
supra note 39.
242 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8036 (2015).
243 See id.
244 The winners of the 2012–2013 contest proposed ideas that led to the
development of a robocall-blocking technology called Nomorobo, which can filter and
block unwanted robocalls. See NOMOROBO, https://www.nomorobo.com/ [https://perma.cc/5
R5W-GQD2]. The reward program was re-launched in 2014 and 2015. See Consumer
Reports: Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature0025-robocalls [https://perma.cc/BRX4-LASW]. The winners in 2015 created an app called
“Robokiller” which
240

241

allows users to block and forward unwanted robocalls to a crowd-sourced
honeypot. The app uses audio-finger print technology to identify unwanted
robocalls, and send them to a SpamBox that users can access at any time.
RoboKiller also gives users more control over how and when they receive
calls, applying white and black list filtering and offering personal settings.
Robocalls: Humanity Strikes Back, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
contests/robocalls-humanity-strikes-back [https://perma.cc/X2WK-4K7F]. This app has
not yet been launched to the marketplace. See id. Despite these solutions, the FTC
received over 3 million complaints for violations of the Do Not Call Registry. See
NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, supra note 8, at 5.
245 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8037 (2015) (emphasis added).
246 “[T]he sole issue appears to be the efficacy of current call-blocking
technology. . . . [P]hone companies grapple with relying on call mitigation technologies that
may be overly-inclusive or -exclusive.” Id.
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offering to consumers in the 2015 Order.247 For example, it
mentions services that enable consumers to block numbers on an
individual basis, and also those that allow them “to designate
categories of incoming calls . . . to be blocked, such as a
‘telemarketer’ category.”248 The Commission encourages carriers
to provide the category blocking service because it would
effectively help consumers “avoid mass unsolicited calling, such as
by telemarketers or scammers, known to cause [them]
problems.”249 Rather than merely encourage this service, the
Commission should require carriers to provide it so consumers
can more effectively screen calls from intentional TCPA violators.
The fact that the Commission encourages carriers to offer
category call-blocking services does not mean that they will. For
example, Verizon’s service requires customers to input a list of
phone numbers that they wish to block.250 This will not effectively
block calls from intentional or overseas callers because consumers
may not be able to pinpoint what number TCPA violators will use
to call. Category blocking technology has a broader scope, and
could even permit consumers to block any calls from numbers
they did not approve with their carrier in advance.251 This
protection would more effectively protect consumers from
malicious TCPA violators, both domestic and overseas.
A mandatory category blocking service would residually
help consumers, but a more effective call-blocking program would
provide them the best protection. As the Commission notes, the
current options are still subject to several problems.252 Since the
Commission is not the proper source of discovery for a new, more
effective call-blocking technology, consumers can only hope that a
new technology is developed soon. This does not mean, however,
that the FCC does not have an important role in that process—
requiring carriers to offer call-blocking services would incentivize
someone in that industry, or a third party, to develop a new, more
effective technology. This would benefit consumers by giving them
the ability to more effectively control the calls they receive.

Id. at 8036.
Id. In addition, the Commission emphasizes the need for programs that avoid
blocking emergency numbers that could “compromise the effectiveness of local and state
emergency alerting and communications programs.” Id.
249 Id.
250 Support, VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/support/residential/phone/home
phone/calling+features/call+block/call+block.htm [https://perma.cc/VB93-WVCD].
251 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8036 (2015).
252 See id. at 8037–38. The Commission provides the example of Caller ID
Spoofing, a process by which callers can evade call-blocking technologies by providing fake
Caller ID information. Id.
247
248
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CONCLUSION
Nobody likes to receive telemarketing calls. Consumers
have complained about them for decades.253 Congress sought to
protect consumers from the burden of unwanted, mass-dialed,
automated phone calls to protect their safety and privacy by
enacting the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 1991.254
Additionally, Congress empowered the FCC to implement rules
and regulations to enforce the provisions of the TCPA.255 The
Commission’s interpretation of “capacity” resulted in an
overbroad definition of “autodialer”—a definition that is not in
line with Congress’s original intent for the TCPA, and will subject
everyday communications between consumers and businesses to
TCPA restrictions and frivolous lawsuits.
To fix both the interpretation and litigation problems
posed by the interpretation, the Commission should narrow its
interpretation of “capacity” so that autodialers are only devices
that have the present ability to “store or produce telephone
numbers . . . using a random or sequential number generator” and
dial those numbers.256 Doing so would eliminate the inevitable
lawsuits facing legitimate businesses and consumers, and
preserve Congress’s intent to protect consumers from unwanted
calls. Additionally, the Commission should require carriers to
provide consumers with the option to block categories of phone
calls to help protect them from malicious TCPA violators. These
changes would best uphold the TCPA’s mission and help make
“the Jerry Seinfeld experience” a thing of the past.
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253 See Wheeler Statement, 30 FCC Rcd. 8066 (2015) (“The American public
has asked us—repeatedly—to do something about unwanted robocalls.”).
254 See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2,
105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
255 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).
256 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A)–(B).
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